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The Road to Prest v Petrodel: An Analysis of the UK Judicial Approach to the 
Corporate Veil—Part 2 
 
Hamiisi Junior Nsubuga* 
Los Watkins** 
Abstract 
This article examines the judicial approach to the corporate veil post-Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Ltd. Analysis is undertaken of the judgment in Prest and of how judges have adapted 
and applied this judgment in subsequent cases. The article offers an evaluation on whether the 
judgment in Prest, has indeed, provided much needed clarity on the judicial approach to the 
concealment/evasion principles as grounds for veil-piercing/lifting. The article concludes by 
advocating for a return to the use of the doctrine of judicial discretion as a tool for addressing 
legal matters relating to the corporate veil of incorporation. 
Introduction 
12 June 2020 marked the 7th anniversary of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) ruling 
in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,1 in which Lord Sumption’s leading judgment appeared to 
rationalise the proper ground for veil-piercing/lifting. This had continually blurred the legal 
lines on the applicability of both principles to matters relating to the corporate veil for decades.2 
The judgment became the defining moment in the history of corporate law of England and 
Wales as it clarified the law or/grounds for piercing the corporate veil of incorporation, an area 
of law that had caused interpretative challenges to judges and also, attracted varied academic 
debates.3 
                                                          
* PhD (Law), LLM, MA, LLB, FHEA. Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Middlesex University London, UK. 
** LLM, BA, LLB, FHEA. Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Middlesex University, London, UK. 
1 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. (Hereafter, Prest). 
2 Prest, at [28] and [35] on Lord Sumption’s distinction between these two principles. 
3 B. Hannigan, “Wedded to Salomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-man 
Company” (2013) 50 Irish Jurist 11 – 39; Peter Bailey, “Lifting the Corporate Veil Becomes a Remedy of Last 
Resort after Prest v Petrodel in Supreme Court” (2013) 336 Company Law Newsletter, 1; W. Day, "Skirting 
Around the Issue: the Corporate Veil after Prest v Petrodel" [2014] L.M.C.L.Q. 269; M. Khimji and C. Nicholls, 
“Corporate Veil Piercing and Allocation of Liability – Diagnosis and Prognosis” (2015) 30 Banking and Finance 
Law Review 211; Edwin C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Ltd: Itching Towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Comp. Law, 39 – 50; Edwin C. Mujih, “Piercing the 
Corporate Veil: Where is the Reverse Gear?” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review, 322 – 337. 
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The leading judgment was given by Lord Sumption who gave some clarity to terms which had 
been applied in previous cases concerning the wrongdoing of company directors and the misuse 
of the veil of incorporation. These were the principles of concealment and evasion, the former 
being “…the interposition of a company or … companies so as to conceal the identity of the 
real actors” and the latter, “…where there is a legal right against the person in control … and 
the company is interposed … to defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement.”4  
Therefore, drawing from the above formulation, the proper ground for piercing the corporate 
veil of incorporation is the evasion principle,5 where the court can disregard the separate legal 
personality of the company to pierce the corporate veil to deprive such a person or the company 
itself, of the advantage otherwise obtained through abuse of the corporate form. This exposition 
became the leading authority on veil-piercing. However, whether this judgment provided “the” 
much needed clarity on the subject of veil piercing/lifting that had caused a barrage of 
confusion, uncertainty and criticisms in earlier cases prior to Prest, remained a hotly 
contestable point of discourse as analysed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
This article examines the judicial approach to the corporate veil post-Prest. The article  
analyses the leading judgment as delivered by Lord Sumption and dicta from fellow judges on 
the bench and how the judgment has been welcomed/adapted by judges in subsequent cases. 
Analysis is also undertaken on whether, the judgment in Prest has provided much needed 
clarity on veil-piercing/lifting. The article concludes by arguing that Prest has so far, not 
provided much needed clarity on the subject of corporate veil-piercing/lifting and that limiting 
veil-piercing to evasion may constrict the development of this fragile area of law. The article 
advocates for a return to the use of the conventional English law principle of judicial discretion 
as the best tool for interrogating conventional legal remedies to address corporate law matters 
on veil-piercing/lifting.    
Prest – the analysis 
Prior to Prest, some of the key concerns drawn from academic literature and judicial decisions 
were the lack of clarity on what exactly the term “veil-piercing” meant or what it entailed, the 
lack of judicial consensus on whether, actually, veil-piercing as a doctrine existed and the 
synonymous use of the phrase “piercing/lifting” the corporate veil among other concerns.6 For 
                                                          
4 Prest, at [28], [35]. 
5 Prest, at [35]. 
6 L. Gallagher and P. Ziegler, “Lifting the Corporate Veil in the Pursuit of Justice”(1990) J.B.L 292; Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, “Abolishing Veil Lifting” (2001) 26(3) Journal of Corporate Law, 470, 481; Mark T. Moore, “A 
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example, in Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No.1),7 Staughton LJ attempted to 
give the distinction between veil-piercing and veil-lifting by suggesting that: “…[p]iercing is 
reserved for treating the rights and liabilities or activities of a company as the rights and 
liabilities of its shareholders while lifting is to have regard to the shareholding in the company 
for some legal purpose.”8  
However, in Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investment Corp of Liberia (No.2),9 
Toulson J was of the view that: “…[i]t didn’t matter what language was used in describing the 
two phrases as long as the principle was clear.”10 Earlier in 2013, before Prest was heard by 
the UKSC, Neuberger LJ, in VTB Capital v Nutrietek,11 had observed that “the obscure nature 
of the rule of veil-piercing supports the point of view that it is unprincipled.”12 He also 
approved Clark J’s observations in The Tjaskemollen13 that cases decided on this subject had 
not worked out what “piercing the veil meant” as it may not always mean the same thing.14  
Munby J, in Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif,15 was of the view that these expressions (of veil-
lifting/piercing) were synonymous.16 Therefore, with such a long list of concerns in relation to 
veil-piercing/lifting before their lordships and ladyship, Prest was welcomed with great 
enthusiasm as a timely solution.17 However, the question has yet to be answered whether, Prest 
lived up to its expectations to deliver the much needed clarity.  
Proponents of Lord Sumption’s leading judgment and the distinction between the two 
principles have praised him, at least, for drawing a fine line on the blurred applicability of these 
principles to matters relating to the abuse of the corporate form that had caused a barrage of 
legal uncertainty and confusion for decades.18 Rationalising the law/grounds for veil-piercing 
also helped to demystify frequently invoked ambiguous metaphorical references to forms of 
                                                          
Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Legacy of Salomon v Salomon” (2006) 
J. B. L.  180; Cheng –Han et al, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: Historical, Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives” (2019) 16(1) Berkeley Bus. L. J. 140, 153.  
7 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No.1) [1991] 4 All ER 769 CA. (Hereafter, Atlas Maritime). 
8 Atlas Maritime, at [779G]. 
9 Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investment Corp of Liberia (No.2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 (Youkong Line). 
10 Youkong Line, at [305]. 
11 VTB Capital v Nutrietek [2013] UKSC 5. (Hereafter, VTB Capital). 
12 VTB Capital, at [123]. 
13 The Tjaskemollen [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 QBD. 
14 VTB Capital, at [472]. 
15 Ben Hashem v Ali Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] EWHC 2380. (Hereafter, Ben Hashem). 
16 Ben Hashem, at, [150]. 
17 Edwin C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: 
Itching Towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Comp. Law, 39 – 50; F. Rose, “Raising the Corporate Sail” (2013) 
LMCLQ 566, 583.  
18 L. Onoran, “The Trust Behind the Veil: Prest v Petrodel” (2013) 5 Private Client Business, 273, 279. 
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corporate abuses, such as “facade”, “sham”, “alter-ego” etc., that had dominated case law prior 
to Prest.19 
It has also been argued that limiting veil-piercing to grounds of evasion has the advantage that 
property concepts in judicial proceedings may be applied consistently.20 Limiting veil-piercing 
to evasion also meant a limit to unnecessary piercing of the corporate veil by ensuring that it is 
only invoked as a remedy of last resort.21 This has the impact that use of other 
conventional/orthodox  private legal remedies, such as those arising out of the law of agency, 
tort or contract are interrogated to settle legal matters.22 Per Lord Sumption,…”[t]he facts will 
in practice disclose a legal relationship between the company and its controller which will make 
it unnecessary to pierce corporate veil…if it not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, it is not 
appropriate to do”.23 
However, despite this minimal gratitude, critics of the judgment in Prest have also utilised 
several platforms to share their assessment of the judgment. However, much of the criticism 
has been focused on Lord Sumption’s distinction between the evasion-concealment principles, 
and the lack of judicial consensus on the proper grounds for veil-piercing in Prest and beyond 
as analysed below. 
Judicial split – Prest and beyond 
The first point of criticism directed at the judgment in Prest is the absence of judicial consensus 
in support of Lord Sumption’s leading judgment amongst the judges that presided over this 
case. Key issues that contributed to this lack of consensus included, inter alia, the narrowness 
of the redefinition of the concealment and evasion principles, and rationalising evasion as the 
true ground for veil-piercing but narrowing its parameters to the company or its controller’s 
attempt to evade pre-existing legal obligations or liabilities.24 
                                                          
19 T. Xing, “The New Era of Corporate Veil-Piercing: Concealed Cracks and Evaded Issues?” (2016) Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 209. 
20 Christopher Hare, "Family Division, 0; Chancery Division, 1: Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Supreme Court 
(Again)" (2013) 72(3) Cambridge L.J. 511, 514. 
21 This point of view has however been subjected to criticism. Particularly, see: R. Matthews, "Clarification of the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil" (2013) 28(12) J.I.B.L.R. 516, 519–520; Peter Bailey, “Lifting the 
Corporate Veil Becomes a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel in Supreme Court” (2013) 336 Company 
Law Newsletter, 1; Edwin C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Ltd: Itching Towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Comp. Law, 39 – 50. 
22 Xing (n 19). 
23 Prest, at [35]. 
24 Prest, at [28], [35]. 
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Neuberger LJ initially agreed that there were essentially, a number of issues25 flowing from 
Lord Sumption’s review of the concealment-evasion principles as a potentially valuable 
judicial tool for undoing wrong-doing in some cases where no other principle is available.26 
He also observed that the doctrine of the veil of incorporation, whilst not actually having been 
required to have been used, should nevertheless, be considered still part of UK law.27 
However, he immediately contended that the evasion principle was a mere aspect of a more 
conventional principle than a distinct principle concerning veil-piercing as it was not founded 
on judicial antecedents.28 He also expressed doubt on the existence of legitimate veil-piercing 
cases as he had previously done in VTB Capital, where he claimed that both cases of Jones v 
Lipman29 and Gilford Motors v Horne30 could have been solved through use of alternative legal 
remedies.31 
Lady Hale did not fully support Lord Sumption’s reasoning, expressing some doubt whether 
concealment and evasion neatly and exhaustively categorised all cases that involved disregard 
of the separate legal personality of the company.32 Her ladyship drew attention to the issue that  
cases on the piecing of the veil thus far, had concerned attribution of the thoughts and actions 
of controlling natural persons to the legal person of the company, suggesting that the remedy 
lay in the company.33 She therefore, suggested a broader classification of cases, such that  
individuals operating limited companies are unable to take unconscionable advantage of people 
with whom they do business.34  
This would logically, lead to the doctrine being placed amongst the rules of attribution. 
However, her ladyship declined to make that connection, considering that “…[w]hat the cases 
                                                          
25 Essentially, these were that the International Court of Justice had acknowledged the doctrine. However, this 
was only in the context of civil law systems, rather than common law. Whilst there had been some UK family 
cases based on the issue, these were not found to be sound for future application, for example, (A v A [2007] 2 
FLR 467 and Ben Hashem [2009] 1 FLR 115) but that the cases of Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935, 
and Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 were useful, but could have been solved through use of alternative legal 
remedies. The other issue was that Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 and Trustor AB v Smallbone 
(No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 1177, should have been decided without consideration of the veil doctrine. 
26 Prest, at [80]. 
27 Ibid., at [80]. “…[i]t would be wrong to discard a doctrine which, while it has been criticised by judges and 
academics, has been generally assumed to exist in all common law jurisdictions, and represents a potentially 
valuable judicial tool to undo wrongdoing in some cases, where no other principle is available.” 
28 Prest, at [69], [83]. 
29 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832. 
30 Guilford Motor Co. Ltd v Horne and another [1993] Ch. 935. 
31 Prest, at [69]. 
32 Prest, at [91] – [92]. 
33 Prest, at [92] “…[w]here it is sought to convert the personal liability of the owner or controller into a liability 
of the company, it is usually more appropriate to rely upon the concepts of agency and of the “directing mind.” 
34 Prest, at [92]. 
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do have in common is that the separate legal personality is being disregarded in order to obtain 
a remedy against someone other than the company in respect of a liability which would 
otherwise be that of the company alone…”35 
Lord Clarke is another judge that did not fully endorse Lord Sumption’s evasion-concealment 
distinction. However, he agreed that veil-piercing cases outside of the evasion principle will be 
rare and difficult to establish. He observed that it would be dangerous to seek to foreclose all 
possible future situations that may arise.36   
Lord Walker went somewhat further in his view of Lord Sumption’s leading judgment by 
observing that all the decided cases so far,37 could have been decided by the application of 
other legal principles. Although his lordship did not go so far as to deny the existence of the 
veil altogether, he did consider that: “…[p]iercing the corporate veil” is not a doctrine at all, in 
the sense of a coherent principle or rule of law. It is simply a label — often used 
indiscriminately to describe the disparate occasions on which some rule of law produces 
apparent exceptions to the principle of the separate juristic personality of a body corporate…”38 
For Lord Mance, although he did not disagree with Lord Sumption’s evasion-concealment 
distinction, he did not support the contention that evasion was the only ground to justify true 
veil-piercing. He expressed caution against the possibility that veil-piercing outside the evasion 
principle should be foreclosed as this would inhibit future development of this rule.39  
Therefore, the lack of judicial consensus on the rationale for true veil-piercing might have 
signalled a cumbersome journey that the decision in Prest was about to take within the judiciary 
in relation to the doctrine of the corporate veil in English corporate law. There was great 
optimism on how courts would react to the judgment and the “default position” that veil-
piercing should only be invoked as a remedy of last resort after exploring other legal remedies. 
This perspective is explored below. 
Prest – in subsequent cases 
Following the decision in Prest, judges in subsequent cases relating to the abuse of the 
corporate form have made references/followed the jurisprudence in Prest, especially, when 
faced with legal questions on whether to “pierce” or “lift” the corporate veil of incorporation. 
                                                          
35 Prest, at [92]. 
36 Prest, at [100], [103]. 
37 With one possible exception, that of Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens (a firm) [2009] UKHL 39. 
38 Prest, at [106]. 
39 Prest, at [100]. 
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However, it may be submitted, the evasion principle, as articulated by Lord Sumption has not 
enjoyed much success as in most of the cases discussed below,  judges have been reluctant to 
invoke the evasion principle to pierce the corporate veil. 
R v Sale 
Almost contemporaneous with Prest, albeit in criminal proceedings, the case of R v Sale,40 
considered Prest as the leading authority while deliberating on whether, a corporate veil of 
incorporation (in addition to two other issues of assessment of benefits and proportionality of 
the confiscation order) should be pierced in criminal confiscation proceedings under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002). The case concerned a confiscation order on a one-
man company, where the controller of the company had been convicted of offences concerning 
Network Rail where he had illegally acquired contracts.  
Treacy LJ considered the various viewpoints put forward by the Justices in Prest, especially 
on the distinction between concealment and evasion from Lord Sumption and the varying dicta 
from other judges on the bench.41 He therefore observed that the evasion principle as 
formulated in Prest did not have application in this case. He was convinced that this was a 
company which had existed long before the corrupt conduct, and which existed for bona fide 
trading purposes.  
He therefore concluded that: 
“…[w]e are not persuaded that this is a case coming within the evasion principle 
referred to at paragraph 28 of Prest….. in this case there was no legal obligation 
or liability which was evaded or frustrated by the interposition of the company 
in this case whereby the interposition of the company would mean that the 
separate legal personality of the company would defeat the right or frustrate its 
enforcement.  This was a company which existed long before this corrupt 
conduct, and which existed for bona fide trading purposes.”42 
Adapting Lord Sumption’s concealment as the most applicable principle to the case, he 
observed that: “…[w]e do, however, consider that in the circumstances of this case, the effect 
of POCA is that this matter falls within the concealment principle…”43 Although the evasion 
                                                          
40 R v Sale [2013] EWCA Crim 1306. (Hereafter, Sale). 
41 Sale, at [26] – [28]. 
42 Sale, at [39]. 
43 Sale, at [40]. 
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principle was not invoked to pierce the corporate veil, this case highlighted at least, some of 
the practical relevance of the decision in Prest – a notion that Lord Sumption’s concealment-
evasion formulation can be applied to extant areas of the law, including criminal proceedings.  
On the other hand, the case also highlighted the thin line between the evasion-concealment 
principles and the challenges they present to judges.44 This is because, in some cases, it is easier 
for the courts to apply Lord Sumption’s evasion/concealment distinction to legal matters before 
them where a single party is involved. For example, in R v McDowell; R v Singh,45 the Court 
of Appeal (CA) followed the jurisprudence in Prest to pierce the corporate veil in a case that 
involved property legally owned by a company controlled by the husband. The CA was 
convinced that this case was not about lifting but piercing the corporate veil as the defendant 
husband was the company’s sole controller and beneficial owner, and therefore, any 
benefits/interest received were to his benefit. 
However in  M v M,46 the court explored Lord Sumption’s evaluations on concealment and 
evasion in the context of property distribution following a petition from the wife to compel the 
husband to transfer to her  a number of properties registered in companies effectively controlled 
by her husband.47  The court observed that in Prest, the husband’s intention for setting up the 
companies was neither to conceal nor evade legal obligations owed to his wife like it was in 
this case.48 The court held that the husband’s intention in this case, was to evade his obligations 
to his wife. This was in addition to frustrating the court’s efforts in the distribution of assets 
following the breakdown of the marriage.49  
In Antonio Gramasci Shipping,50 a case concerning the unlawful diversion of profits between 
companies controlled by Mr Lembergs, Beatson LJ observed that a court may only pierce the 
veil when a person evades an existing legal obligation, and deliberately frustrates that 
obligation by the interposition of a company under their control. Unfortunately, Beatson LJ did 
                                                          
44 This notion is further highlighted by Professor Hannigan, who observes that there is a thin line between the two 
principles of concealment and evasion that is difficult to apply consistently and objectively. This was because 
concealment is inherent in many cases premised on evasion and indeed, evasion is commonly achieved through 
concealment. This has meant that post-Prest cases harbour a lack of clarity, yet the consequences of veil-
piercing/lifting are remarkably similar, in that, both lead to the disregard of the Salomon principle, citing R v Sale 
as an example. See, B. Hannigan, “Wedded to Salomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the 
Veil of the One-man Company” (2013) 50 Irish Jurist 11, 35 – 37. 
45 R v McDowell; R v Singh [2015] EWCA Crim. 173. 
46 M v M [2013] EWHC 2534 (Hereafter M v M] 
47 M v M, at [169]. 
48 Prest, at [36]. 
49 M v M, at [169]. 
50 Antonio Gramasci Shipping Corp and Others v Lembergs and Others [2013] 4 All ER 157 ( Antonio Gramasci). 
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not take the opportunity to elaborate on the doctrine in any great depth. However, he did seem 
to take the view that it was not likely that future courts would extend it beyond the existing 
evasion and concealment principles of Prest,51 thereby highlighting a thin line between 
concealment and evasion.  
Pennyfeathers Ltd v Pennyfeathers Property Co. Ltd.52 
This case was heard by the court just a few months following Prest which presented an 
opportunity for the judgment in Prest to be explored. The case raised issues regarding claims 
against company directors, (Mr Bowdery and Mr Attwell, the second and third defendants) for 
breaching their fiduciary duties while acting as directors to Pennyfeathers UK. The claim was 
that both directors deprived Pennyfeathers UK Ltd of its opportunity and interest, by causing 
their company (Pennyfeathers Jersey – the first defendant) to exploit a corporate opportunity 
(a piece of farmland and options to buy surrounding land for a residential property 
development) that otherwise belonged to Pennyfeathers UK. 
Before reaching their decision, the court explored both issues of evasion and concealment, as 
they were key in unravelling the mysteries behind the alleged directors’ breaches and potential 
liabilities. Exploring the concealment principle, the court held that:“…[t]here was no need to 
pierce the corporate veil…the concealment principle meant that Mr Bowdery and Attwell could 
not interpose Pennyfeathers Jersey to disguise the nature of their own conduct in diverting the 
opportunities they would have pursued on behalf of Pennyfeathers UK for their own benefit 
instead.”53 
As regards the evasion principle, the judges were of the view that: 
“…[f]ortunately, the position here is not as opaque at it was in Prest. ..the 
interposition of Pennyfeathers Jersey and Trimount Settlement should not be 
allowed to defeat Pennyfeathers UK’s right against the (directors) Mr Bowdery 
and Attwell or to frustrate the enforcement of those rights”.54 
The court therefore, found that the benefits of the contracts entered into by Pennyfeathers 
Jersey (first defendant) were to be impressed with the same trust as they would, if entered into 
                                                          
51 Antonio Gramasci, at [66]. 
52 [2013] EWHC 3530 (Hereafter, Pennyfeathers) 
53 Pennyfeathers, at [117]. 
54 Pennyfeathers, at [118]. 
10 
 
by the second and third defendants – the directors personally.55 It may be noted that this case 
is one of the few that followed and applied Lord Sumption’s formulation and distinction 
between the concealment and evasion principles and correctly. Credence should be given to 
the fact that the courts approached the concealment principle in this case, as a tool to ascertain 
whether the second and third defendants (the directors) were sufficiently involved in diverting 
the opportunities of Pennyfeathers UK to the first defendant (Pennyfeathers Jersey) and 
encouraged it to seize that opportunity, which would amount to breach of their duties, and 
therefore, not a case for veil piercing.56 
R v Powell 
R v Powell,57 is another example of a case that followed the jurisprudence in Prest.58 The case 
concerned a company that had caused criminal environmental pollution through non-
compliance with environmental permits, under the control of its directors who had been 
convicted of illegally benefiting from corporate abuse.59 The defendants relied on the UKSC 
decision in Prest  arguing that, as neither of them had been the sole controller nor sole 
shareholder of the company, neither concealment nor evasion as established in Prest should 
apply.   
Before giving its final judgment, the court explored the jurisprudence in R v Seager & Blatch60 
(decided pre-Prest) which dealt with the defendants hiding under the corporate veil to 
perpetrate criminal activities that resulted in criminal convictions under POCA 2002. The court 
examined three issues that are important in POCA proceedings namely; (a) the defendant’s 
benefit from the relevant criminal conduct, (b) the value of the benefit obtained and (c) Sum 
recoverable from defendants61 to decide whether,  to “lift” or “pierce” the corporate veil. 
Consequently, the court held that  the corporate veil may be pierced in “appropriate 
circumstances”62 to obtain a clear picture of the benefit obtained from director’s criminal 
conduct or actions.  
Aikens LJ elaborated on these circumstances by stating that: “…[a] court can “pierce” the 
carapace of the corporate entity and look at what lies behind it only in certain circumstances.  
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 Pennyfeathers, at [117]. 
57 R v Powell and another [2016] EWCA Crim 1043. (Hereafter, Powell). 
58 Powell, at [20] – [22] and [29], [31]. 
59 Powell, at [2] – [5]. 
60 R v Seager & Blatch [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 60. (Hereafter, Seager). 
61 Seager, at [68]. 
62 Seager, at [69]. 
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It cannot do so simply because it considers it might be just to do so.….. In the context of 
criminal cases the corporate veil can be pierced. First, if an offender attempts to shelter behind 
a corporate facade, or veil, to hide his crime and his benefits from it…Secondly, where an 
offender does acts in the name of a company…Thirdly, where the transaction or business 
structures constitute a “device”, “cloak” or “sham”... 63 
Following these observations therefore, the court concluded that:  
“...[t]here was no facade or concealment for hiding behind the company's 
structure in a way which abused the corporate shield ...... this was not a company 
being run for an unlawful purpose but rather, was a legitimate business which 
had broken the criminal law ..... the analysis of the evasion principle enunciated 
by Lord Sumption in Prest, demonstrates that the applicant falls well short of 
establishing the necessary conditions for fixing these respondents with 
liability.”64 
However, the court emphasised the need to approach the application of the evasion principle 
to pierce the corporate veil with caution.65 The court observed that with relation to Prest, the 
evasion doctrine needed to be construed in the narrowest sense, as to do otherwise could run 
the “…risk (of) making every company director liable to the confiscation regime whenever a 
company broke the criminal law.”66 Therefore, a restatement that the courts have in a majority 
of cases following Prest, not favoured the invocation of the evasion principle to pierce the 
corporate veil at the earliest opportunity. 
Rossendale Borough Council & Another v Hurstwood Properties Ltd  
In November 2018, the CA had another chance to further, test the decision in Prest in a tax 
evasion case petitioned by two borough councils. This was in the case of Rossendale Borough 
Council & Ors v Hurstwood Properties Ltd.67 In this case, Rossendale and Wigan borough 
councils sought to recover unpaid Non-Domestic  Rates (NDR) for unoccupied hereditaments 
                                                          
63 Seager, at [76]. 
64 Powell, at [31]. 
65 This point of view echoes Prof. Rose’s observations that the evasion principle may be perceived as a definitive 
and comprehensive restatement of factors to be considered for veil-piercing and can also be seen as an imprecise 
prescription for future development of some basic notion of corporate abuse, especially, the notion of piercing as 
a remedy of last resort which was not fully explained. See, F. Rose, “Raising the Corporate Sail” (2013) LMCLQ 
566, 583. 
66 Powell, at [30]. 
67 Rossendale Borough Council & Ors v Hurstwood Properties [2019] EWCA Civ 364. (Hereafter, Rossendale). 
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from the defendants who had granted leases of these hereditaments to newly incorporated 
Special Purpose Vehicles companies (SPV).  
The SPV were shortly placed into voluntary liquidations and later struck off the companies 
register as dormant companies. This had the effect that the SPV would be exempted from 
liability for the NDR since under the Non-Domestic Rating (Unoccupied Property) (England) 
Regulations 2008), any property whose owner is a company that is undergoing voluntary 
liquidation is exempted from NDR liability under regulation 4K.68 
The main legal argument from the claimants was that the separate legal personality of the SPVs 
should be disregarded and the corporate veils pierced as companies (SPVs) had been interposed 
for the sole purpose of avoiding NDR liability, which was an act of impropriety designed to 
evade a legal obligation.69 
While delivering the leading judgment, Richards LJ referred extensively to the decision in 
Prest observing that “…[t]he principle of piercing the corporate veil had only been successfully 
invoked in very rare cases….most of these cases involved instances where corporate vehicles 
had been used as a "deception, to disguise the true involvement of the defendant", or where the 
relevant company was acting as the agent of the defendant….in a minority of successful cases 
(perhaps only two), the so-called evasion principle applied, where, to quote Sumption LJ: 
"there is a legal right against the person in control of [the company] which exists independently 
of the company's involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal 
personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate the enforcement"70  
Therefore, rejecting the notion for piercing the corporate veil of the SPVs, he concluded that: 
“[i]t is not, in my judgment, possible to apply the evasion principle to the facts 
of the present cases. The liability that arose on a daily-basis was that of the SPVs 
alone and not of the defendants….This would be different if the leases were 
found to be shams but this allegation had been struck out. It is thus as a matter 
of law, impossible to say, as one must if the evasion principle is to apply, that 
the defendants were under an existing obligation or liability for NDR during the 
                                                          
68 Rossendale, [11] – [12] 
69 Rossendale, at [13], [17]. 
70 Rossendale, at [50] – [51]. 
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terms of the leases which they deliberately evaded by interposing a company 
under their control.”71 
His Lordship also confirmed that in his opinion, it was not open to courts to pierce the corporate 
veils of SPVs.72 This, can also be viewed as another restatement of the judicial commitment to 
preserve the Salomon principle, that is, the separate legal personality doctrine upon which 
English Company Law is built. 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, the topic of veil-piercing/lifting remains a hotly contestable area of law 
under UK corporate law. However, what can be drawn from the judicial decisions explored in 
this treatise is the notion that limiting veil-piercing to evasion alone as promulgated by Lord 
Sumption may leave veil-piercing as a means of countering corporate abuse in a state of legal 
quandary. This may not only leave judges in perplexity, but also, litigants seeking legal 
remedies for wrongdoing suffered at the hands of those in control of companies with whom 
they do business.  
In Gramsci Shipping Corp. v Lembergs Ltd,73 a case decided immediately following Prest that 
concerned the unlawful diversion of profits between companies controlled by Mr Lembergs, 
the CA observed that; “…[a]bscent a principle, further development of the law will be difficult 
for the courts because development of common law and equity is incremental and often by 
analogical reasoning.”74 Therefore, limiting veil-piercing to evasion may constrict the 
development of common law relating to the corporate veil. 
Corporate abuse as a concept is quite broad and it can be perpetrated in many different ways. 
For example, it may occur by way of money laundering which may involve concealment of 
financial transactions and activities of those involved. This can also transcend into evasion 
where concealed financial transactions lead to evasion of existing obligations such as taxes and 
liabilities. Therefore, to broaden the parameters within which remedies for corporate abuse and 
impropriety may be legitimately addressed, there is a need to reconsider limiting veil-piercing 
to a rule or set of inflexible rules that may lead to unwanted ramifications.75  
                                                          
71 Rossendale, [39]. 
72 Rossendale, [59]. 
73 [2013] EWCA Civ 730. (Gramsci Shipping Corp.). 
74 Gramsci Shipping Corp., at [66]. 
75 For instance, Matthews is of the opinion that the UKSC missed an important opportunity in Prest to 
discontinue/abandon the veil piercing doctrine that had created huge interpretative and procedural confusion 
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Cases on veil-piercing  often call for the disregard of an established and long-standing doctrine 
of English corporate law – that is, the doctrine of separate legal personality. Therefore, any 
decisions to disregard this doctrine ought to be approached with utmost clarity. There is a need 
to clearly ascertain the link between the wrong committed by the controller and the company’s 
involvement, and that having explored all other conventional legal remedies, equities point 
towards piercing of the corporate veil.76 
However, this may fairly be achieved through use of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion is 
an established principle of English law that has for centuries, aided judicial statutory 
interpretation77 and decision-making in England and Wales.78 Owing to this established legal 
principle, judges in veil-piercing cases should be given the flexibility to explore viable legal 
structures to find the best approach to solving corporate abuse cases, rather than limiting them 
to the confines of “who controls or owns” the company and what “pre-existing” 
obligations/liabilities were being evaded as formulated by Lord Sumption in Prest.79 
As affirmed by the judges in Prest that veil piercing should be considered as a remedy of last 
resort, this notion widens the scope for establishing when it is “necessary” to pierce the 
corporate veil. This may be achieved after all other conventional legal remedies are explored, 
which calls for the exercise of judicial discretion. Therefore, the failure by the judges in Prest 
to clearly explain what forms of corporate abuse would constitute evasion to pierce the 
corporate veil, and relegating veil-piercing to a tool of last resort may be inferred as a judicial 
invitation to use judicial discretion in addressing corporate abuse cases in subsequent cases 
following Prest, a notion that should be given utmost consideration. 
                                                          
within the legal field. He contends that this doctrine harbours weaknesses that have been acknowledged by the 
judiciary in many cases preceding Prest but the UKSC failed to address them in that case. He therefore calls for 
the doctrine to either be clarified or abandoned as its abandonment may not inhibit procedural justice in 
incorporate law matters as judges have always found other conventional routes to circumvent matters around the 
corporate veil. See, R. Matthews, "Clarification of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil" (2013) 28(12) 
J.I.B.L.R. 516, 519–520. 
76 This aspect would also align veil-piercing to “piercing as a remedy of last resort” as formulated in Prest, at [35]. 
77 As re-affirmed in Re Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637. 
78 Randall McGowan, “The Image of Justice and Reform in Early Nineteenth Century England” (1983) 32 Buffalo 
L. Rev. 89 – 125; Peter King, “Decision Makers and Decision Making in English Criminal Law 1750 – 1800” 
(1984) 27 (1) The Historical Journal 25 – 58. 
79 Pey W. Lee, “The Enigma of Veil Piercing” (2015) 26(1) I.C.C.L.R 28, 32. 
